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WEALTH EFFECTS OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION 
AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 
by Raymond Brastow and David Rystrom* 
1. Introduction 
In September of 1984, President Reagan 
signed into law a compromise bill that sped up 
and simplified the government certification 
process for generic drugs that are substitutes for 
patented brand-name drugs and in return granted 
brand-name manufacturers longer patent protec 
tion. This law, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, was the 
end result of a series of debates and proposed 
changes in patent protection laws that began in 
1959. The final version of the law contained 
provisions that were both favorable and unfavor 
able to drug producers; therefore, the expected 
net impact upon drug producing firms was not 
immediately clear. This paper examines the 
impact of this change in government regulation 
by examining stock prices of drug firms around 
the time of the legislative discussion of the bill 
in the summer of 1984. Using daily stock 
returns, we find a significant increase in stock 
prices of firms primarily engaged in the 
manufacture of generic drugs. We find no 
significant impact on prices of firms engaged in 
the manufacture of already existing, brand name 
drugs. Thus, the Act appears to have produced 
net benefits to the drug industry. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
provides the historical background to the 
legislation and the sequence of events leading to 
the passage of the law. Section 3 discusses the 
economic significance of the law and describes 
the hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 describes 
the data and the methodology of the study. 
Section 5 presents the results and their interpre 
tation, and Section 6 summarizes the findings. 
2. Congressional Action on Drug Prices, 
Patents, and Competition 
Debate over the effect of patents on the 
pharmaceutical industry has continued in Con 
gress for more than 25 years. In December of 
1959, the Subcommittee on Antitrust and 
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
began hearings on the relationship between 
patents, high drug prices, and large profits in the 
drug industry. The hearings continued through 
1960 and by 1961 a series of amendments to the 
1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act were 
proposed which were designed to foster compe 
tition among drug companies. Although the bill 
was widely supported, debate over its provisions 
kept it from making rapid progress until 
significant changes were made in committee. 
Ironically, the version which eventually reached 
the floor and was passed in 1962 had been 
stripped of the provisions which dealt with the 
original concerns: drug prices and profits.1 The 
law was chiefly concerned with the safety and 
effectiveness of new drugs and resulted in the 
FDA approval process becoming more lengthy; 
drugs had to be proved effective as well as safe. 
The law did, however, require that the generic 
name of a drug be on its label, thus providing 
the impetus for eventual generic competition. 
Throughout the succeeding two decades, 
continuing debate took place concerning the 
effects of patents on the drug industry. In 
addition to the allegation that patents create 
"excessive" profits, the 1962 legislation had 
created a different concern: the new drug 
approval (NDA) process had become so lengthy 
that it took much of the 17-year patent period to 
bring a drug to market. To correct this, the 
Patent Extension Act of 1981 was passed by the 
Senate on July 9; this bill would have granted 
extensions of patents for up to seven years to 
drugs that had been the subject of a lengthy 
approval process. However, the bill failed to 
pass in the House of Representatives in a very 
close roll-call vote. It was sent back to 
committee and died at the end of 1982, at least 
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partly because of intense lobbying by the generic 
drug industry. 
Patent hearings began in 1983 in both houses. 
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration was introduced into both the 
Senate and the House. The compromise bill was 
intended to counterbalance the patent extension 
aspects of the 1982 bill by adding benefits to 
generic interests. It had three major provisions: 
1. Extension of an abbreviated approval 
process to generic versions of drugs approved 
after 1962. Existing law provided for this 
abbreviated approval only for generic versions 
of drugs for which the original patented version 
was approved before 1962. A firm wishing to 
produce a generic version of a drug approved 
after 1962 had to go through the same lengthy 
NDA process as the original patent-holder. This 
provision was the most important one of the bill; 
it would clearly reduce time and costs to bring 
generic substitutes to market. 
2. Direction to the FDA to postpone approval 
of a generic drug that was the subject of 
litigation over patent infringement brought by 
the patent holder. The postponement would be 
in force until the case was decided, but could 
last no longer than eighteen months. 
3. Single extension of a first patent for drugs 
subject to FDA approval. The extension would 
last two years for drugs awaiting approval at the 
time of the bill's enactment and up to five years 
for drugs submitted for approval after enact 
ment. However, the total length of patent 
protection could not exceed fourteen years from 
the date of FDA approval. This had the effect of 
moderately lengthening the patent protection 
period for some brand-name drugs. 
This version of the bill was perceived as being 
favorable to generic drug producers, even 
though it had been constructed as a carefully 
built, compromise which had the support of all 
trade groups and the leadership of both parties. 
However, eleven major brand-name manufactur 
ers split with their trade group and lobbied 
against the bill. When the bill was sent to the 
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, 
it was strongly opposed by those brand-name 
manufacturers and consequently was altered 
again in committee to grant additional protection 
to brand-name firms. The amended bill was 
reported favorably by the committee on August 
8, containing three new provisions. 
1. The maximum postponement of generic 
drug approval during patent infringement litiga 
tion was extended from 18-30 months. 
2. For new drugs without active patents, no 
generic version could be approved for two, 
three, or five years after the approval of the 
original, depending on the nature of the drug. 
3. The patent-holder could decide the patent 
for which to request an extension. The original 
version of the bill had specified that the first 
patent would be the only one eligible for an 
extension.2 
The Senate passed the bill on August 10. The 
house passed an almost identical version on 
September 6, the Senate agreed to the House 
version on September 12, and the President 
signed it into law on September 24. Passage of 
the bill was the culmination of a 25 year debate 
on drug prices and patents. 
3. Economic Implications and 
Hypotheses 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 was a compromise bill 
which conferred benefits to manufacturers of 
both brand-name and generic drugs. The major 
provision of an abbreviated approval process for 
generic drugs was clearly of benefit to generic 
drug producers; generic drugs could be brought 
to market considerably sooner and at lower cost 
than under the previous law. However, this 
benefit may have been partially or completely 
offset by provisions protecting brand-name firms 
that extended patent lengths and granted in 
creased protection to new unpatented drugs, thus 
delaying the potential introduction of generic 
competitors in the future. 
Since in an efficient stock market stock prices 
reflect the market's expectation of the future 
profitability of a firm, the market's assessment 
of the expected impact of a new law can be 
examined by observing changes in stock prices 
associated with times of legislative action on the 
bill. By analyzing daily stock prices we examine 
the hypothesis that investors viewed the legisla 
tion to be on balance a net benefit to the generic 
industry. Formally, we perform a test for the 
null hypothesis that there was no impact on 
share prices from the legislation. Similarly, we 
also examine the expected effect of the bill on 
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brand-name producers by examining the behav 
ior of the stock prices of those firms. 
Although the bill was involved in congres 
sional deliberations for several months (see 
Table 1), we chose August 8 as the pivotal date 
for our analysis of stock prices. At that time the 
Judiciary Committee reported to the Senate the 
final compromise version that satisfied the 
objections of the eleven major brand-name 
manufacturers who had refused to endorse 
earlier versions of the bill. This event had two 
effects: it overcame the final opposition to the 
bill, making passage appear more probable, and 
it granted additional protection to brand-name 
interests. Therefore, the net impact of the event 
on generic firms' stock prices could have been 
positive or negative. If the bill's passage was 
widely anticipated prior to August 8, then 
generic stock prices would have fallen due to 
downward revision of the previously anticipated 
impact of the bill. Generic stock prices would 
have risen if the compromise provisions resulted 
in newly formed anticipations of passage of a 
bill which was on balance favorable to the 
generic industry. Similarly, a decrease in prices 
of brand-name firms' stocks would indicate an 
increased probability of passage of a bill 
unfavorable to these firms, while an increase in 
their stock prices would reflect the anticipated 
benefits of the additional provisions. 
4. Data and Methodology 
We first examine the stock prices of the five 
publicly traded firms primarily engaged in the man 
ufacture of generic drugs: Bolar Pharmaceutical, 
Lyphomed, Mylan Labs, Par Pharmaceutical, and 
TABLE 1 
Selected Events Associated with the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984 
June 12 House Energy and Commerce 
Committee reports bill 
July 28 House Judiciary Committee re 
ports bill 
August 8 Senate Judiciary Committee re 
ports revised bill 
August 10 Senate passes bill on voice vote 
September 6 House passes bill 362-0 
September 24 President signs bill 
Zenith Labs. Bolar Pharmaceutical was traded on 
the American Stock Exchange (ASE) while the 
four others were traded in the Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) market. Daily stock prices were obtained 
from Standard and Poor's Daily Stock Price 
Record. The closing price was used for Bolar Phar 
maceutical while the asked price was used as the 
daily price for the OTC stocks.3 
We also examine the stock prices of six major 
firms engaged in the manufacture of brand-name 
drugs that were often mentioned in the news as 
being vulnerable to imminent competition from 
generic substitutes. These firms were American 
Home Products, Merck, Pfizer, Searle, Smith 
kline Beckman, and Upjohn. This list is not 
exhaustive of all producers of vulnerable brand 
name drugs; we constrained our sample to 
publicly traded firms for which production of 
brand name drugs was an important source of 
revenue and profits.4 All of these firms' stocks 
were traded on the New York Stock Exchange; 
we used daily closing prices in the analysis. 
For each group of firms, a time series of daily 
common stock returns was constructed for two 
periods during 1984. The first period consists of 
the 100 trading days from January 5, 1984 
through May 25, 1984. This period is used as a 
comparison period for analysis because it 
precedes the time of congressional deliberation 
and action. The second period consists of the 
101 trading days from May 29, 1984 through 
October 18, 1984. This period includes the dates 
of all congressional discussion and action on the 
bill and is centered on August 8, 1984, the date 
of final Senate Committee action on the bill (see 
Table 1). Average returns for each day are 
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the 
individual returns of the companies in each 
group. This return can be interpreted as the 
return to an equally-weighted portfolio of the 
stocks in each group. The use of portfolio 
returns averaged across securities mitigates the 
possible influence of firm-specific effects. 
We then calculate market adjusted returns for 
each portfolio by subtracting the daily return on 
the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite Index from 
each daily portfolio return to get a measure of 
return corrected for market movements. This pro 
duces a series of returns for each group of firms; 
we then observe the market adjusted return on and 
surrounding the dates of legislative events. 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Dann 
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(1980), and others have demonstrated that the 
tests using "raw" returns, mean adjusted 
returns, market adjusted returns, or risk adjusted 
returns produce results that are quite similar, 
especially when daily returns are analyzed. 
Adjusting returns for risk has little or no impact 
on results or power of tests when daily returns 
are used. We report our results in terms of 
market adjusted returns in order to demonstrate 
the magnitude of the "abnormal" portion of the 
impact, but the significance of our results was 
unchanged when we examined raw returns and 
mean adjusted returns.5 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents cumulative market adjusted 
portfolio returns around the date of final 
congressional committee action on the bill for 
generic firms and brand-name firms. Column 1 
identifies the trading date relative to day 0, 
which is August 8, the day that the Senate 
committee reported the final version of the bill. 
Columns 2 and 3 present the cumulative market 
TABLE 2 
Cumulative Market Adjusted Portfolio Rates of 
Return for 101 Trading Days Surrounding 
August 8, 1984 
Brand Name 
Trading Day Generic Firms Firms 
-50 -0.03 -0.21 
-40 3.75 1.81 
-30 4.73 4.96 
-20 8.46 -2.32 
-10 6.10 -3.39 
- 5 12.80 -3.68 
- 4 11.53 -3.79 
- 3 11.26 -4.83 
- 2 11.66 -6.22 
- 1 15.29 -5.17 
0 15.57 -5.75 
+ 1 19.27 -6.64 
+ 2 2.35 -5.25 
+ 3 20.92 -5.20 
+ 4 21.40 -5.65 
+ 5 22.72 -5.52 
+ 10 27.79 -6.49 
+ 20 26.15 -5.73 
+ 30 17.18 -6.67 
+ 40 18.47 -3.16 
+ 
50_15?1_-2.38 
adjusted daily returns for the equal weighted 
portfolio for each group of firms. It is apparent 
from the table that generic firms' stock prices 
rose markedly over this period, with much of the 
increase occurring near August 8. Brand name 
firms' stock experienced slight negative market 
adjusted returns over the same time period. 
Table 3 examines the dates of August 8, 9, 10 
(Friday), and 13 more closely by presenting the 
daily market adjusted returns for each portfolio of 
firms. August 8 is the date that the altered version 
of the bill was reported by the Senate committee 
while August 10 is the date that the Senate passed 
the bill. Since the exact time during the day that 
the information became available to the market is 
unclear, the information may have been im 
pounded into stock prices on the event day and/or 
the subsequent day. We find that the August 9 
market adjusted return is 3.70% and the August 
10 market adjusted return is 3.07% for generic 
firms, both of which are statistically significant at 
the 5% confidence level.6 This is strong evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the bill, even after 
alterations favoring brand-name interests, pro 
vided net benefits to generic firms; the joint events 
of the committee's reporting of the bill and the 
Senate's passage of the bill caused an unantici 
pated increase in the aggregate wealth of share 
holders of generic drug companies of over 6%. 
Based on the prices and number of shares out 
standing for these firms as of August 8, this ab 
normal return translates into an increase in wealth 
by shareholers of approximately forty million dol 
lars. 
The evidence about brand-name firms is less 
conclusive. There is positive market adjusted 
return, statistically significant at the 5% level, 
for August 10, the date of Senate passage; no 
other significant returns are evident. We inter 
pret this evidence to indicate that the market 
viewed passage of the bill as providing net 
benefits to brand-name firms, relative to prior 
expectations. That is, while the bill may indeed 
have had a net negative impact on brand-name 
firms (which is suggested by the cumulative 
returns shown in Table 2), the final passage of 
the altered version of the bill was a pleasant 
surprise producing a positive impact on brand 
name stock prices. However, it is surprising that 
there is no observable impact for brand-name 
firms on August 8 or August 9. In addition, we 
note that the cumulative four-day return for 
62 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 29 Jan 2013 13:55:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TABLE 3 
Daily Market Adjusted Returns for Generic and Brand-Name Drug Companies 
August 8-August 13, 1984 
Generics Brand Names 
Rp(%) t-statistics Rp(%) t-statistic 
Aug 8 0.28 0.03 -0.58 -0.90 
Aug 9 3.70 2.73* -0.89 -1.40 
Aug 10 3.07 2.23* 1.40 2.28* 
Aug 13_-1.42_-1.32_OJ05_0.11 
. . Rp? Re 
t statistic =-1/0 
s(l + l/n)1/2 
where: Rp 
= the daily portfolio return on day 0 
Re = the mean portfolio return during the control period, 0.26% for generics and 0.08% for brand-names 
s = the sample standard deviation of the time series of the portfolio returns during the control period, 
1.26% for generics and 0.62% for brand-names 
n = the number of observations in the control period, n= 100 * 
Significant at the 5% level. 
brand-name firms for the dates examined in 
Table 3 is approximately zero. Therefore, an 
appropriate conclusion may be that the passage 
of the Act had no net impact on brand-name 
firms. 
Our hypothesis is that there was a significant 
impact upon drug manufacturers' stock prices at 
the time that the market judged passage of the 
bill to be likely. We have focused our study on 
the dates of August 8 and August 10, but there is 
obviously some difficulty in determining the 
appropriate dates to be examined for any event 
of this kind; the market is constantly reassessing 
the probability of a bill's passage throughout the 
legislative process, so the total impact of the law 
on stock prices may be spread over several days 
of legislative events. (Schwert (1981) reviews 
the application and difficulties of using stock 
market data to assess the impact of legislative 
actions.) 
Since there are several dates in 1984 on which 
there was legislative action on the event (Table 
1), we also examine the returns associated with 
those dates. Table 4 presents the market adjusted 
returns for 3 trading days surrounding each 
event date described in Table 1. We include the 
trading day prior to the event, the event date, 
and the day after the event in our analysis 
because of the uncertainty about the exact time 
of the market's first receipt of the information. 
We also calculate the mean 3-day return and a t 
statistic to test the hypothesis that the mean 
market adjusted return over the 3-day period is 
significantly different from the mean market 
adjusted return for the comparison period.7 
For generic firms, we observe that only the 
3-day mean returns for August 8 and August 10 
are statistically significant, although the positive 
returns observed around the June 12 and July 30 
events are weakly suggestive of possible im 
pacts. Since the August 8 and August 10 
three-day periods are overlapping, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that both events jointly 
produced the abnormal returns associated with 
the two dates. The evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that passage of the bill increased 
the wealth of shareholders of generic drug firms. 
For brand-name firms, no mean returns are 
significant for any of the legislative events. This 
result indicates that the Act had no significant 
effect on the value of the brand-name firms. 
This result is not surprising as all of these 
companies are large and diversified; thus the 
impact on any single product could be small 
relative to the rest of a firm's product lines. Any 
economic effect from the Act could easily be too 
small to be observed in the firm's stock prices. 
6. Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that the compromise 
drug legislation of 1984 increased the wealth of 
shareholders in generic drug manufacturing 
firms; the market evaluated the compromises 
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TABLE 4 
Market Adjusted Returns for 3 Day Periods Around Dates of Legislative Events (%) 
A. Generic Firms 
Trading Day Relative To Event ~ D 
Date -1 0+1 Mean Return t-statistics 
June 12 2.55 -0.11 -1.01 0.48 0.29 
July30# 1.31 -0.44 2.92 1.26 1.35 
Aug 8 3.63 0.28 3.70 2.54 3.05* 
Aug 10 3.70 3.07 -1.42 1.78 1.98* 
Sept 6 0.52 -1.77 -0.30 -0.52 -1.03 
Sept 24 -0.62 1.56 -0.79 0.05 -0.40 
B. Brand-Name Firms 
June 12 0.73 -0.12 0.39 0.33 0.69 
July30# -0.36 0.00 1.31 0.32 0.65 
Aug 8 1.05 -0.58 -0.89 -0.14 -0.61 
Aug 10 -0.89 1.40 0.05 0.19 0.30 
Sept 6 -0.06 0.55 -0.04 0.15 0.19 
Sept 24_-0.62_0/22_(^54_O05_-0.08 
_Rp3~~Rc 
r/nasa2 + ncsc2\/l + m1/2 
[\na + nc-2/\na nJJ 
where: Rp3 
= mean portfolio market adjusted return over 3 days 
Re = the mean portfolio market adjusted return during the control period 
sa = the sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns over the 3 day announce 
ment period 
sc = the sample standard deviation of the portfolio market adjusted returns during the control period 
na = the number of observations in the announcement period, na 
= 3 
nc = the number of observations in the control period, nc= 100 
* 
significant at the 5% level 
# July 28, the date the bill was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee was a Saturday. We use July 
30, the first trading day following the event, as day 0. 
incorporated in the bill as producing expected 
net benefits to the generic industry.8 In addition, 
we conclude that the major part of the impact of 
the bill was capitalized into share prices in the 
four days surrounding the date of its passage in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full 
Senate, more than three months before it became 
law. 
The results of the analysis of brand-name drug 
manufacturers are not as conclusive but suggest 
that there was no significant impact on the stock 
values of brand-name firms. Apparently the 
compromise features of the final bill and the 
resolution of uncertainty about the bill were 
viewed as being favorable to brand names to 
such an extent as to offset the expected costs 
from future competition from generic manufac 
turing firms. 
Notes 
1. For a detailed history of the 1962 legislation, see 
Harris (1964). 
2. Patent-holders typically have several patents over 
a drug and the critical patent which maintains 
exclusive marketing power is often not the first. 
3. We examined the data to determine if use of bid 
prices or the mean of bid-asked prices altered our 
results and found no significant differences. 
4. Even though we restricted our sample of brand 
name drug producers, the firms in our sample 
arc 
still relatively large ones that produce many 
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products other than patent protected drugs. It was 
not possible to determine what proportion of each 
firm's sales were of prescription drugs vulnerable 
to generic competition. The firms did include in 
their 1984 annual reports the proportion of their 
sales from their divisions that included pharma 
ceuticals. The mean percentage of sales of each 
firm that was accounted for by its division that 
included prescription drugs was 50%. The range 
was from Merck's 34% of sales from their 
"Human and Animal Health Products" division to 
66% for Upjohn's "Human Health Care" divi 
sion. Obviously, prescription pharmaceuticals 
would constitute only a proportion of sales for 
each division. However, each company clearly 
considered prescription drugs to be its "lead 
products"; the 1984 annual report of each 
company began with a description and discussion 
of the firm's major prescription drugs. In some 
annual reports, the 1984 Act was noted as a 
potential negative factor for the firm's future 
sales. We also found some additional evidence 
that potential loss of sales to a generic competitor 
is a significant, wealth-reducing event to a large 
brand-name producer. On July 10, 1984, the Food 
and Drug Administration approved a generic 
substitute (produced by a nonpublicly traded firm) 
for a Merck product, Aldemet, a popular drug for 
the treatment of high blood pressure. Merck's 
stock fell 45/8 point on the day of the announce 
ment, a negative return of 5.1% for one day. This 
event, which was not directly related to legislative 
activity about the 1984 Act, provides some 
preliminary evidence that an event that increases 
the probability of generic competition is poten 
tially significant, even to a large diversified firm. 
5. We also estimated a Beta coefficient for each 
portfolio using daily returns from the comparison 
period. The estimated Beta was .63 for generic 
firms and .88 for brand-name firms (each 
statistically significant at the 1% level), indicating 
that these firms had relatively low levels of 
systematic risk. We did not risk adjust our returns 
because of the well-known measurement prob 
lems with Betas and the unlikelihood of risk 
adjusted returns affecting any results when daily 
data is analyzed. 
6. The t-statistic is distributed Student-t under the 
assumption that portfolio daily returns are inde 
pendent, identically distributed, and normal. 
Where the sample size is large, as here, the test 
statistic is approximately normal. See Dann 
(1981), Fama (1976), and Brown and Warner 
(1985) for a discussion of this test and evidence 
about distributions of daily returns. 
7. For a discussion of this test, see Dann (1981). 
Leftwich (1981) performs a test for multi-day 
announcement period returns based on cumulative 
returns over the announcement period. The test 
are approximately equivalent. 
8. Whether the bill benefited consumers is unre 
solved by our analysis. The expectation that the 
generic industry would become more profitable 
does not necessarily imply that consumers would 
be expected to gain. Consumer interest groups 
lobbied for the bill in Congress, presumably 
because they expected greater availability of 
generic substitutes to result in savings for 
consumers. However, welfare implications for 
consumers hinge on the acceptance by consumers 
of generic versions of brand-name drugs and on 
the price response by brand-name producers. If 
consumers are reluctant to purchase generic 
drugs, perhaps due to the cost of acquiring 
information about their quality, and brand-name 
firms increase their prices in response to generic 
competition then consumers in the aggregate may 
suffer a welfare loss. See Leffler (1981) for a 
discussion of the issues involved in new product 
entry to drug markets. 
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